Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II: What the Supreme Court’s Freight Broker Liability Ruling Means for Trucking Attorneys
For years, one of the first questions in a catastrophic trucking case involving a freight broker was whether the broker could be dismissed before the merits of its carrier selection practices were ever examined.
On May 14, 2026, the United States Supreme Court materially changed that analysis.
In Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U.S. 219, 146 S. Ct. 1199 (2026), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, commonly called the FAAAA, doesn’t preempt the type of state law negligent hiring claim brought against freight broker C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. The Court concluded that the FAAAA’s safety exception preserves state authority over claims concerning motor vehicle safety, including a claim that a broker failed to use reasonable care when selecting an allegedly unsafe motor carrier.
That holding matters well beyond one preemption dispute.
For attorneys investigating catastrophic truck crashes, Montgomery changes the liability map. A case analysis that once might have ended with the driver, motor carrier, and available carrier insurance may now require a much closer investigation of the entities that selected the carrier, arranged the shipment, established qualification criteria, approved exceptions, monitored carrier performance, and profited from putting that carrier on the road.
But Montgomery needs to be read carefully.
The Supreme Court didn’t hold that C.H. Robinson was negligent. It didn’t establish a national standard for broker vetting. It didn’t decide that every broker owes every highway user the same duty under every state’s law. It didn’t impose automatic liability whenever a broker selected a carrier that later caused a crash.
What the Court did was remove a significant threshold obstacle.
The next generation of freight broker cases will therefore be less about whether federal preemption categorically shuts the courthouse door and more about what the broker actually knew, what it reasonably should have known, what information was available when the carrier was selected, what the applicable state law required, and whether the broker’s decision contributed to the collision.
That is a very different litigation landscape.
The Crash Behind Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II
The case arose from a 2017 collision in Illinois.
Yosniel Varela Mojena was transporting a load for Caribe Transport II, LLC when his truck left its course and struck a tractor trailer operated by Shawn Montgomery that was stopped on the side of the highway. Montgomery suffered severe and permanent injuries, including the loss of his leg. C.H. Robinson had brokered the shipment and selected Caribe Transport to perform the transportation.
Montgomery sued the driver, the Caribe entities, C.H. Robinson, and related entities.
The broker claim was not simply that C.H. Robinson happened to be somewhere in the transportation chain. Montgomery alleged that C.H. Robinson negligently selected Caribe despite information concerning the carrier’s safety record.
According to the allegations described by the Supreme Court, Caribe had a conditional safety rating from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The alleged deficiencies included driver qualification, hours of service, inspection, repair and maintenance, crash rate, and other safety related areas. Montgomery claimed this information meant C.H. Robinson knew or should have known that selecting Caribe created an unreasonable risk of a crash.
That distinction is critical.
The claim connected the broker’s carrier selection decision directly to highway safety.
Why the FAAAA Became the Central Issue
The FAAAA contains a broad express preemption provision.
Under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), states generally may not enact or enforce laws having the force and effect of law that are related to the price, route, or service of a motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to transportation of property. Congress enacted the provision as part of the economic deregulation of interstate transportation.
But Congress also included an important limitation.
Section 14501(c)(2)(A) says that the preemption provision doesn’t restrict a state’s safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles.
The litigation question became whether a state common law negligent hiring claim against a freight broker falls within that safety exception.
Federal appellate courts had divided on the answer.
The Seventh Circuit in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. and the Eleventh Circuit in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc. took positions favoring preemption. The Ninth Circuit in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. and later the Sixth Circuit in Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc. reached the opposite conclusion on the safety exception. The Supreme Court specifically identified that circuit split when explaining why it took Montgomery.
The stakes were substantial. If preemption applied and the safety exception didn’t, the broker’s actual carrier selection practices could become largely irrelevant because the state tort claim itself could be barred.
The Supreme Court rejected that result for the negligent hiring claim before it.
What the Supreme Court Actually Held
Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The Court did something important procedurally. It assumed without deciding that the FAAAA’s general preemption provision would otherwise reach Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim. It then held that the safety exception saved the claim from preemption.
That means attorneys should be precise when describing the decision.
Montgomery did not hold that broker negligent hiring claims are completely outside the FAAAA’s general preemption provision. Instead, the Court held that the particular safety related negligent hiring claim before it falls within the statutory exception to that preemption.
The Court first recognized that state common law duties and standards of care can constitute part of a state’s regulatory authority over safety. It then focused on the statutory language preserving state authority “with respect to motor vehicles.”
The Court interpreted that phrase according to its ordinary meaning. A claim is sufficiently related to motor vehicles when it concerns or regards vehicles used in transportation. A negligent hiring claim alleging that a broker failed to exercise reasonable care when selecting an unsafe carrier plainly concerned the trucks that would be used to transport the freight.
That was enough.
Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim fell within the safety exception.
The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case.
The Most Important Word in Montgomery May Be “Safety”
It would be easy to describe Montgomery as holding that freight broker negligence claims are no longer preempted.
That is too broad.
The Court tied its holding to motor vehicle safety.
That distinction has already begun to matter.
Only weeks after Montgomery, a federal court in Texas considered Grupo Gusi S. de P.R. de R.L. de C.V. v. Select Transport Partners LLC. There, the plaintiff alleged negligent carrier selection in connection with cargo that was allegedly redirected and stolen.
The court distinguished the case from Montgomery. It reasoned that negligent selection of an allegedly fraudulent carrier in a cargo theft dispute didn’t concern motor vehicle safety in the same way as negligently selecting an unsafe carrier that creates a risk of a highway accident. The negligent hiring claim remained preempted.
That post Montgomery decision helps define the boundary.
The safety exception isn’t an all purpose escape from FAAAA preemption. The connection between the alleged negligence and motor vehicle safety still matters.
For catastrophic truck crash attorneys, that means pleadings and proof should explain the safety connection with specificity.
The theory shouldn’t simply be:
“The broker selected the carrier, and the carrier caused a crash.”
The stronger question is:
What information existed before the load was assigned that should have caused a reasonably careful broker to question whether this carrier could safely perform the transportation?
That is where the case becomes fact intensive.
Montgomery Does Not Establish Broker Negligence
This may be the most important limitation for lawyers evaluating new cases.
The Supreme Court decided a federal preemption question. It didn’t adjudicate the merits of Montgomery’s tort claims.
The Court didn’t decide duty under every state’s law.
- It didn’t decide breach.
- It didn’t decide actual cause.
- It didn’t decide proximate cause.
- It didn’t decide damages.
- It didn’t create a federal negligent selection cause of action.
- And it didn’t create a nationwide checklist that a freight broker must follow before tendering a shipment to a motor carrier.
Instead, Montgomery permits qualifying state law claims to get past the federal preemption issue. The substantive elements of the claim still depend on the law governing the case.
That distinction is already appearing in subsequent litigation.
On August 4, 2026, the Fifth Circuit decided Crane v. Penske Transportation Management, L.L.C. The plaintiffs alleged that Penske Transportation Management negligently hired Liberty Lane to transport a shipment without adequately investigating the carrier’s qualifications. The district court had granted summary judgment on FAAAA preemption grounds.
While the appeal was pending, Montgomery was decided.
The Fifth Circuit recognized that Montgomery abrogated the district court’s preemption analysis and revived the broker claim. But Penske presented a different argument: that it owed no duty under Texas law. The Fifth Circuit declined to decide that issue in the first instance and remanded the case.
That procedural posture previews what attorneys should expect after Montgomery.
The fight moves downstream.
Once preemption no longer disposes of the claim, defendants can attack the existence and scope of a state law duty, whether the carrier’s history created notice, whether the broker acted reasonably, and whether anything the broker did actually caused the collision.
A Conditional FMCSA Rating Is Important, but It Isn't the Same as an Order to Stop Operating
The facts alleged in Montgomery create another issue attorneys should treat carefully.
Caribe allegedly had a conditional FMCSA safety rating.
Under FMCSA guidance, a conditional rating means that a carrier’s safety management controls are inadequate, but those deficiencies haven’t reached the level associated with an unsatisfactory rating under the federal safety fitness standard. An unsatisfactory final rating can prohibit a carrier from continuing interstate commercial motor vehicle operations.
That creates a significant litigation question.
A broker defendant may argue that the federal government still authorized the carrier to operate. FMCSA itself cautions users not to infer that a carrier is unsafe merely because certain Safety Measurement System data appears unfavorable. The agency states that SMS information is used primarily for enforcement prioritization and is not itself a federal safety fitness rating.
A plaintiff may respond that federal authorization to remain in operation doesn’t necessarily answer the separate state law question of whether a broker acted reasonably in selecting that carrier for a particular shipment when confronted with specific safety information.
Montgomery didn’t resolve that tension.
That’s precisely why the carrier selection record matters.
The future battleground is unlikely to be a simplistic argument that any carrier with an active DOT number was necessarily a reasonable selection or, conversely, that one adverse safety metric automatically establishes negligence.
The more persuasive inquiry is contextual.
- What did the broker know?
- When did it know it?
- What information did its own systems display?
- What criteria did the broker claim to use?
- Were exceptions made?
- Had the carrier previously been rejected?
- Were there repeated safety warnings?
- Were safer alternatives readily available?
- Did the broker’s internal policies require additional review that never occurred?
Those questions go well beyond whether a carrier technically remained authorized to operate.
Montgomery Makes the Broker’s Decision Process a Major Discovery Target
For plaintiff lawyers, one practical consequence of Montgomery is that the investigation shouldn’t stop with the carrier’s driver qualification file and maintenance records.
The broker’s selection process may now become central evidence.
A meaningful broker investigation may include the broker and carrier agreement, individual load confirmations, carrier onboarding records, qualification criteria, internal safety policies, exception procedures, requalification schedules, communications concerning the carrier, Transportation Management System records, carrier scorecards, suspension or warning records, prior load history, internal notes, safety vendor data, and documents identifying who approved the carrier for the particular shipment.
It may also matter whether the broker used outside carrier qualification services and what those services reported at the relevant time.
The timing is critical.
A carrier’s safety profile today isn’t necessarily the carrier’s safety profile on the day the broker assigned the load.
FMCSA’s public Safety Measurement System uses rolling information, including inspection and crash information, and is updated over time. The system also provides carrier history information and historical measurement runs. FMCSA’s data dissemination program publishes monthly SMS datasets and other carrier records that can help reconstruct what information existed during an earlier period.
For that reason, preservation should begin early.
The relevant question isn’t merely what investigators can see on SAFER or SMS after the crash. It’s what the broker could see, what its proprietary systems contained, and what a reasonable selection process would have revealed before the load moved.
Broker or Motor Carrier? The Label May Not Answer the Question
Another consequence of expanding the investigation upstream is that attorneys shouldn’t automatically accept the transportation company’s contractual label.
A company may possess multiple forms of transportation authority or perform different functions in different transactions.
The Seventh Circuit’s earlier decision in Montgomery separately considered whether C.H. Robinson could be vicariously liable for the carrier and driver’s conduct. Applying Illinois law, it concluded that the carrier and driver were independent contractors rather than C.H. Robinson’s agents based on the evidence of control presented in that case. That vicarious liability issue was distinct from the negligent hiring claim ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Other cases can produce different results on different facts.
In July 2026, a Kentucky appellate court applying Montgomery in Fruge v. Integrity Express Logistics LLC reversed a preemption ruling while also recognizing that questions remained about whether the defendant acted as a broker or carrier in the transaction. The court pointed to evidence including the bill of lading and noted that additional discovery could bear on the entity’s actual role.
The lesson for attorneys is straightforward.
The name printed on a contract is evidence, but it shouldn’t automatically end the inquiry.
- Examine what the entity actually undertook to do.
- Examine its authority.
- Examine the bill of lading.
- Examine who selected the carrier.
- Examine who controlled operational details.
- Examine communications with the shipper, carrier, and driver.
- Examine whether freight was rebrokered or subcontracted.
- And examine whether the defendant’s role changed as the transaction moved from the shipper to the roadway.
What the Kavanaugh Concurrence Tells Attorneys About the Next Phase of Litigation
Justice Brett Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to explain why he viewed the statutory question as closer than the majority opinion suggested.
His concurrence deserves attention from plaintiff lawyers and defense counsel alike.
Justice Kavanaugh emphasized that Congress was deregulating the economics of trucking, not eliminating the traditional role of state law in highway safety. He also noted the relative absence of meaningful federal standards governing how brokers evaluate a carrier’s safety before selection.
But the concurrence also contains an important warning against overreading the decision.
Justice Kavanaugh explained that the ruling shouldn’t mean brokers will routinely face liability whenever a truck crash occurs. A broker that acts reasonably and selects reputable carriers should have substantial defenses, and ordinary tort concepts such as proximate causation remain important limitations on liability.
For attorneys, that reinforces a central point:
The value of a broker claim after Montgomery will depend on evidence, not merely the presence of a broker in the load chain.
The strongest cases are likely to involve evidence showing a meaningful disconnect between what a broker knew or reasonably should have learned and the decision it actually made.
The Liability Investigation Should No Longer Stop at the Motor Carrier
This is where Montgomery intersects most directly with catastrophic trucking litigation.
When injuries are life altering or a crash results in death, the damages can greatly exceed the financial resources immediately visible at the scene.
A conventional investigation might identify the driver, the motor carrier, the tractor and trailer, applicable liability insurance, and potentially an employer or equipment owner.
That remains essential.
But it may no longer be complete.
A modern trucking case can involve a shipper, freight broker, third party logistics company, motor carrier, subcontracting carrier, rebroker, equipment owner, leasing company, driver, and other entities performing different roles in the movement of a single load.
Montgomery doesn’t make every entity liable.
It does mean that attorneys have stronger grounds to investigate whether an upstream broker independently contributed to the risk by negligently selecting the motor carrier.
In a catastrophic case where the motor carrier’s available insurance is insufficient to compensate for the harm, that investigation can be especially important. A viable broker negligence claim may identify an additional responsible defendant and potentially additional insurance or financial resources.
But those possibilities should never be described as automatic.
Broker liability must be proved. Insurance coverage must be independently analyzed. Policy language matters. Exclusions matter. Tender and notice issues matter. The existence of a viable tort claim doesn’t itself establish coverage under a particular policy.
The strategic point is narrower and more defensible:
After Montgomery, attorneys evaluating catastrophic trucking cases have a stronger reason to investigate beyond the motor carrier before concluding that the available recovery ends with the carrier’s policy limits.
In catastrophic cases, that investigation may reveal additional responsible parties beyond the driver and motor carrier, including freight brokers and other entities involved in selecting, arranging, or controlling the transportation.
For attorneys handling catastrophic trucking cases, the practical takeaway is straightforward. Before assuming the available recovery ends with the motor carrier’s insurance, it may be worth examining the complete transportation chain, including who selected the carrier, what safety information was available, and whether additional entities may bear responsibility.
Post Montgomery Decisions Are Already Showing What Comes Next
The Supreme Court decided Montgomery on May 14, 2026. The lower courts have already begun applying it.
On June 23, a federal court in Texas distinguished Montgomery in the cargo theft context and held that a negligent carrier selection claim involving alleged fraud did not fall within the motor vehicle safety exception.
On July 8, the Seventh Circuit formally responded to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Montgomery’s own case. It vacated the district court judgment concerning Montgomery’s negligent hiring counts and remanded those claims for further proceedings. The merits therefore remain to be litigated.
On July 17, the Kentucky Court of Appeals relied on Montgomery to reverse a preemption based dismissal in Fruge. Importantly, that court emphasized that Montgomery’s binding holding should be applied carefully and left additional questions concerning broker status, vicarious liability, and the possible reach of the safety exception for future development.
Then, on August 4, the Fifth Circuit in Crane reversed the judgment protecting a freight broker from a negligent hiring claim because Montgomery had displaced the district court’s FAAAA analysis. Yet the court expressly left the state law duty question for the district court to address on remand.
Taken together, these early cases support a larger conclusion.
The preemption battle isn’t necessarily disappearing, but the center of gravity is shifting toward the actual tort claim.
That means state law research, early preservation, transportation industry discovery, expert analysis, historical safety information, and proof of causation will become increasingly important.
A Practical Montgomery Framework for Evaluating a New Truck Crash
When a catastrophic trucking case reaches intake, counsel should consider building a transportation chain before making assumptions about who is legally relevant.
Start with the load itself.
Who owned the freight?
Who agreed to transport it?
Who arranged transportation?
Who selected the carrier?
Did that company act as a broker, motor carrier, or both at different points?
Was the load transferred, subcontracted, or rebrokered?
Which entity issued the load confirmation?
What contracts governed each relationship?
Then reconstruct the carrier’s safety picture as it existed when the assignment was made.
A present day screenshot won’t necessarily answer that question.
The investigation may require historical FMCSA information, SAFER data, SMS records, licensing records, insurance history, inspection data, previous violations, investigations, crashes, internal broker records, and evidence from third party qualification platforms.
FMCSA itself cautions that SMS data shouldn’t be treated as a federal safety rating or a standalone determination of overall carrier safety. That makes careful analysis even more important.
Finally, connect the alleged selection failure to the crash.
A poor vehicle maintenance history may matter very differently in a brake failure case than in a collision caused entirely by an unrelated event. Hours of service problems may be highly relevant where fatigue is alleged. Driver fitness records may become central where the driver’s qualifications are at issue.
The closer the known safety problem is to the mechanism of the crash, the stronger the causation theory may become.
Montgomery gets the claim through the federal preemption door.
It doesn’t eliminate the need to prove what happened once inside.
Attorney Referrals and Co Counsel in Catastrophic Trucking Cases
Catastrophic trucking litigation can become significantly more complex when the transportation chain includes brokers, multiple carriers, subcontractors, overlapping operating authority, disputed agency relationships, and damages that may exceed the most obvious layer of insurance.
Defiance Injury Law works with referring attorneys on serious trucking and catastrophic injury matters where the potential liability extends beyond the driver and motor carrier. Cases involving freight broker selection, upstream transportation entities, complex insurance issues, or inadequate carrier limits may warrant a broader liability investigation before the available recovery is evaluated.
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II Frequently Asked Questions
Did the Supreme Court hold that freight brokers can be liable for truck crashes?
The Court held that the FAAAA does not preempt the type of state law negligent hiring claim brought by Montgomery because it falls within the statute’s motor vehicle safety exception. The Court did not decide that C.H. Robinson was actually negligent or that brokers are liable whenever a carrier they select causes a crash.
Was Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II unanimous?
Yes. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a separate concurrence joined by Justice Samuel Alito.
What federal statute was at issue?
The dispute centered on 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). Section 14501(c)(1) contains the FAAAA’s preemption provision for certain state laws relating to motor carrier and broker prices, routes, and services. Section 14501(c)(2)(A) preserves state safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles.
Does Montgomery create a federal negligent hiring claim against brokers?
No. The decision addresses federal preemption. The underlying claim remains a state law tort claim, and the plaintiff must establish the elements required by the applicable state’s law.
Does the decision establish a national freight broker vetting standard?
No. The Supreme Court did not create a federal checklist describing exactly what brokers must investigate before selecting a carrier.
That unanswered question is likely to become one of the central litigation issues after Montgomery.
Is an active DOT number enough to defeat negligent selection?
Not necessarily, but neither does adverse FMCSA data automatically establish negligence.
FMCSA warns that public SMS information should not automatically be treated as a determination of a carrier’s overall safety condition. A carrier generally remains federally authorized unless it has received a final unsatisfactory rating or is otherwise prohibited from operating.
The state law reasonableness inquiry can therefore require more than checking whether authority was technically active.
What does a conditional FMCSA safety rating mean?
FMCSA describes a conditional rating as indicating that safety management controls are inadequate but have not resulted in the level of violation associated with an unsatisfactory safety fitness rating.
In Montgomery, the alleged conditional rating and the safety deficiencies underlying it were central to the plaintiff’s negligent selection allegations. The Supreme Court did not decide whether those facts ultimately prove negligence.
Can freight broker claims involving cargo theft rely on Montgomery?
Not automatically.
In Grupo Gusi v. Select Transport Partners, the Southern District of Texas distinguished Montgomery and held that negligent selection allegations involving cargo theft did not implicate motor vehicle safety in the same way as the personal injury claim in Montgomery.
Does Montgomery affect vicarious liability claims?
The Supreme Court decided the negligent hiring preemption issue. It did not establish a general rule for broker vicarious liability.
Agency, control, statutory employment, broker versus carrier status, and related issues can require separate legal and factual analysis.
Are courts already applying Montgomery in other catastrophic truck cases?
Yes.
For example, the Fifth Circuit relied on Montgomery in Crane v. Penske Transportation Management in August 2026 to reject the district court’s FAAAA preemption basis for summary judgment on a broker negligent hiring claim. The case was remanded, including for further consideration of state law issues.
Why does Montgomery matter when the motor carrier has limited insurance?
Catastrophic damages can exceed the insurance or assets available from the motor carrier alone. When the evidence supports a negligent carrier selection theory, Montgomery removes a significant federal preemption defense and can make investigation of the broker an important part of identifying all potentially responsible parties.
The ruling does not guarantee broker liability or insurance coverage. Both must be established separately.
Legal Disclaimer
This article is provided solely for educational and informational purposes, particularly for attorneys and other legal professionals evaluating developments in commercial trucking litigation. It is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as a substitute for independent legal research, analysis of the governing jurisdiction, review of the complete case record, or advice concerning any specific claim.
Nothing in this publication creates an attorney client relationship, co counsel relationship, referral agreement, fiduciary relationship, or other professional relationship with Defiance Injury Law or any of its attorneys. Contacting the firm or reviewing this material does not create such a relationship.
The discussion of Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC concerns the Supreme Court’s federal preemption ruling. The Supreme Court did not determine that C.H. Robinson or any other freight broker was negligent, legally responsible for Montgomery’s injuries, or liable for damages. Allegations described in court opinions should not be treated as established findings unless and until proved or otherwise adjudicated.
Freight broker liability remains highly dependent on the facts of the individual transaction and the substantive law of the applicable jurisdiction. Questions involving duty, breach, agency, broker versus motor carrier status, causation, damages, insurance coverage, contractual indemnity, admissibility of federal safety information, and other issues may vary significantly from one case to another.
Court decisions, statutes, regulations, FMCSA systems, and transportation industry practices can change. Attorneys should independently confirm all authorities and the current procedural status of cited cases before relying upon this article in litigation, pleadings, briefing, settlement evaluation, or client advice.
No statement in this article should be interpreted to mean that a freight broker is liable merely because it selected a motor carrier that was later involved in a crash, that unfavorable FMCSA data independently proves negligence, or that the existence of a viable broker claim guarantees additional insurance coverage or recovery.
Past results and prior court decisions do not guarantee any particular outcome in another case.
